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readings. 1, like O'Connor (as I understand him), think R is extremely plau-
sible on both readings. However, there are those who find R plausible on 
the first reading but not on the second. I don't have the space here to defend 
the plausibility of R on the second reading. Let me just say that to reject R 
on that second reading, it seems one would need a reason to think there is 
no good that (a) includes the permission of all inscrutable evil but doesn't 
include divine intervention of the kind that would make it possible for us to 
discern reasons for the permission of such evils and (b) is greater than any 
other obtainable good that doesn't include such things or other things as 
bad. But we don't have a reason to think there is no good like this. Our 
inability to identify such a good certainly doesn't provide us with such a 
reason. 
10. My thanks to Dan Howard-Snyder, Bill Rowe and Linda Zagzebski 
for their comments on earlier drafts. 
Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy by Jennifer A. Herdt. 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv and 300. Cloth $59.95 
ELIZABETH RADCLIFFE, Santa Clara University 
Jennifer Herdt's fascinating book is a study of the concept of sympathy 
in Hume's moral philosophy. So why this title? What makes Herdt's 
discussion unique is that she examines this central notion in Hume's 
moral theory in the context of religion and its divisive effect on seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century society. Her thesis is that when Hume's 
moral theory is studied within the tradition of natural law from which it 
is descended, it becomes evident that Hume replaces divine revelation 
in previous moral frameworks with the workings of natural sympathy. 
Generally, the argumentation of this book is historical; that is, Herdt 
defends various claims concerning the philosophical development of 
Hume's moral philosophy by appealing to the ideas and current events 
to which he is reacting. Herdt's interpretation appeals to a breadth of 
Hume's writings, including the critical essays and The History of England. 
Consequently, readers should not come here looking for an analytic 
study of the arguments in Hume's ethics; rather, they should expect an 
interpretation in a broad, historically-informed setting. At the same 
time, Herdt's discussion leads to some interesting claims about the con-
tent of Hume's moral theory that I wil1later address here. 
The purpose of Herdt's plan is clear: She wants to reject the approach 
to Hume that has mainly seen him as concerned with epistemology, and 
substitute for it an interpretation that sees Hume as concerned in his 
work with achieving a social outcome-namely, peace and prosperity. 
Then, she claims, Hume's political essays and the History form a unified 
corpus with his other very famous works (Preface, xiii). Herdt explains 
that her book, to which it is well worth devoting some time, is designed 
to defend eight claims. 
(1) Hume's project is best understood in the context of natural law, 
but it is more radical than the other natural law theorists. They purport 
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to give accounts of morality by appeal only to human nature, but steal in 
reference to Providence; Hume, on the other hand, makes no such sur-
reptitious references. (2) A major goal in the Treatise of Human Nature is 
to replace the role of Providence in morality with a naturalistic concept 
that connects morality to human flourishing without being egoistic. (3) 
That concept is sympathy, and so to understand the secularization of 
moral theory, we must understand sympathy. (4) Hume recognizes that 
natural, unregulated, sympathy can reinforce prejudices and divisions, 
and so he argues that moral judgment requires a correction of sympa-
thetic feelings; this leads to a normative, and not merely a descriptive, 
account of moral judgment. (5) This nonnative account, developed 
through the essays and the History, requires that we have the capacity to 
enter into the perspectives of others and this allows us to overcome fac-
tions. (6) A theme of these works is that religious fanaticism and sectari-
anism undermine the role of sympathy in making moral judgments. (7) 
Hume holds that the lives of those who lead so-called "artificial" lives, 
the lives of religious zeal, cannot be entered into sympathetically. (8) 
Hume's own capacity for sympathetic understanding is adequate only if 
he is right that theism is logically untenable, although he is still correct 
to hold that good judgment requires a sympathetic understanding of 
actions in history. 
It is difficult to disagree with most of the main claims in Herdt's pro-
ject here, and she substantiates her readings with previously neglected 
material concerning the development of the concept of sympathy, a 
"near-obsession" for eighteenth-century moralists who wanted to elude 
the charge of egoism. She traces the notion of sympathy in the 
Latitudinarians, who reacted to the Calvinist doctrine of the viciousness 
of human nature with the claim that sympathy and pity demonstrated 
the benevolence of human passions. Shaftesbury incorporated the view 
of the Latitudinarians into his theory of the sympathetic sharing of plea-
sures, but Shaftesbury added a pessimistic note about the abuses of sym-
pathy when limited to one's own sect. The enemies of the sympathy-
based moralists were first, Hobbes, who depicted people as only self-
interested, and later, Mandeville, who charged that those who thought 
sympathy instinctual could not argue that it was meritorious at the same 
time. So, Butler then argued that human beings engage in a reflective 
process in which they place themselves imaginatively in the situation of 
others. All of these formulations set the stage for Hume, Herdt argues, to 
introduce his new account of sympathy-new, she says, because Hume is 
the first to suggest that sympathy is the source of moral judgments, and 
not only of motivations or information about the state of others (32-38). 
I want to examine critically a few of the moves in Herdt's interpreta-
tion. She initiates her discussion by remarking, "Hume's account of 
sympathy is often dismissed as an unfortunate example of associationist 
psychology, which Bume introduces in the Treatise but thankfully has 
the sense to take out of the restatement of his moral theory in the 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (1). She later supports this 
assessment by appealing to Philip Mercer and Pall Ardal (42)', who com-
plain that Hume's account of sympathy depicts it as mechanical and 
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instinctual. She is certainly right to object to their perspectives, but their 
views should not be taken to represent the state of Hume scholarship on 
the matter. Hume's account of sympathy from the Treatise is taken quite 
seriously by current scholars in Humean ethics and by contemporary 
virtue theorists as well, and much recent analysis has centered on sym-
pathy and its role in making us both moral judges and the subject of 
mora] judgments.' 
One interesting issue which emerges in Herdt's discussion is whether 
Hume has an account of normativity in his moral theory, or whether he 
means it as a purely descriptive account of how we derive mora I judg-
ments. Herdt maintains of Hume's account of natural sympathy and its 
correction: "To the extent to which this is seen as an attempt to give an 
account of the origin of our moral distinctions, of the way in which 
moral distinctions first developed out of pre-moral distinctions, rather 
than an account of how the capacity for good moral judgment can be 
formed, it is misguided" (78). She thinks that Hume includes normativi-
ty in his account, but that he can only get it by begging the question. 
Her argument is that an attempt to found the normative on the natural 
can never get back to the "purely" natural, for any account of how 
morality arises out of some aspect of human nature already assumes 
that feature is morally important and others are not. So, Hume can justi-
fiably describe how we make moral judgments, but he cannot give an 
account of the genesis of morality itself.3 Still, he presents a normative 
(not merely descriptive) account, but one that simply cannot explain the 
source of value itself. 
But I think Herdt's remarks presuppose a framework foreign to 
Hume's project. The account of how we make moral judgments is 
Hume's account of how our moral distinctions arise. The label "moral" 
here means what we take to be moral; it is not a designation of a special 
quality bestowed on our concepts by something beyond our own experi-
ence. To charge that Hume can never get beyond the normative to the 
natural supposes a demarcation of the moral versus the natural that was 
not a part of Hume's perspective, not a feature of his naturalistic theory 
of morality. That we don't take our natural moral sentiments to be 
indicative of morality, but instead filter them through a correction 
process, doesn't imply that we have stolen the normative into the correc-
tion process we have chosen. Rather, the correction process is necessi-
tated by a practical need; and since we regard the results as indicators of 
morality, on Hume's account, that is how moral distinctions arise for us. 
Herdt's examination of Hume's theory progresses through a discus-
sion of the controversy over the pleasures of tragedy. What sort of peo-
ple take pleasure in seeing the sufferings of others, certain eighteenth-
century Calvinist critics ask, and ought we to allow cultivation of such 
habits through the theater? Hume's stand on this issue was evident 
both through his critical essays and his support of the production of a 
controversial tragedy in Edinburgh, a play named Douglas, on a Scottish 
folk hero, written by a relative and friend, John Home. Hume's philo-
sophical answer to the problem of tragedy, Herdt argues, was to point to 
the role of belief, but not to a simple distinction between our reaction to 
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fiction and genuine belief. That is a distinction which he sometimes has 
trouble making on his phenomenal characterization of belief in terms of 
force and vivacity. Rather, he analyzes belief in terms of connections of 
ideas that form a coherent network (108-10). Exactly how Herdt's solu-
tion is related to what Hume goes on to say about sympathy in his essay 
"Of Tragedy" isn't entirely clear, but with some work, one can get the 
point. In that essay, Herdt claims, Hume's view is that the presence of 
an aesthetic framework makes us feel uninvolved as spectators to 
tragedy, just as when we have limited sympathy with others, we are 
unaffected by their situations; in neither case is there a "moral claim" 
made on us, no call to action. Further, Hume charges that religious fac-
tions have the same effect as literature or poetry-namely, they induce 
an "artificial connection among the ideas". So, Herdt is promoting the 
idea that Hume's solution to the problem of taking pleasure in tragedy is 
to replace these artificial systems that produce a distorted sense of reali-
ty with natural belief systems that require broad perspectives (111-16). 
Herdt's analysis proceeds then to show that Hume turns his advocacy 
of wide sympathetic understanding of foreign viewpoints into an attack 
on Scottish Evangelicals, arguing that the artificiality of their moral sys-
tem makes it inaccessible to our general understanding. She maintains 
that the sort of sympathy doing the work in Hume's theory is a reflec-
tive understanding, informed by refined and expert judgment, as indi-
cated in Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste". In other words, we 
are not actually capable of taking on the feelings of others, so Hume's 
theory is not one of moral sentiment, but one of sympathetic under-
standing (121, 125, 166-67). 
The obvious question to ask about Herdt's spin on Hume's account of 
sympathy is: What happens to the motivational aspect of his account? I 
don't have the space here to argue for an interpretation of Hume that 
shows how our sympathetic responses, which when taken from "a gen-
eral point of view" ground our moral judgments and are motivating, but 
I have argued at length for this thesis elsewhere.4 This interpretation is, 
I maintain, the import of Hume's various famous claims about the moti-
vating force of "morality". If we couple the thesis that our sympathetic 
responses are motives with Hume's claims about how reason alone does 
not motivate us, then it is puzzling how Hume can mean the product of 
sympathy to be only sympathetic understanding. For I think there is very 
good reason to consider reason and understanding as purely intellectual 
and not motivational "faculties" (functions, not faculties reified), pro-
ductive of beliefs, but not on their own productive of motives. 5 
Herdt's final chapter and conclusion argue that, due to "an ironic fail-
ure on Hume's part to extend sympathetic understanding to religious 
believers," he makes an unjust accusation in charging that religious sys-
tems propagate narrow perspectives and prejudices. "Hume can make 
sense of the possibility of entering sympathetically into the situation of 
someone without embracing his or her beliefs or way of life, but this 
possibility does not extend to theism since theism is not simply wrong 
but' absurd' and' artificial''' (Herdt, 223). I think that to embrace 
Herdt's perspective is to see Hume's conclusions in the Dialogues 
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Concerning Natural Religioll as insincere in a certain respect; indeed if he 
was convinced first of the logical incoherence (and not just the falsity) of 
theism, why should he not then view the way of life that springs from it 
as absurd? I am not here to defend him in his conclusions, but to won-
der whether Herdt is correct in her accusation, which implies that Hume 
argued from the charge of absurdity. Perhaps Hume's disdain for reli-
gious factionalism in eighteenth-century England motivated his discus-
sions; did it also motivate the conclusions of particular arguments? It is 
up to Hume's readers to ask whether his arguments concerning religious 
belief are sound. 
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God Without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism by Peter 
Forrest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). ISBN 0-8014-3255-3. Pp, 
xiv, 256. 
SIMON J, EVNINE, California Polytechnic State University 
Near the beginning of his book, Peter Forrest tells us of "the sensitive 
New Age cat who never eats meat and never hunts birds and lizards. 
Does it, I ask, ever get the chance? Likewise," he goes on to add, "it is no 
wonder that intellectual conversion to religion is rare-no one ever 
